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Abstract
D. Wallace has tried to use decoherence to solve the preferred basis problem of
Everettian Quantum Mechanics, and this solution lays the foundation for his proof of
the Born rule. But this is a circular argument, as approximations used in decoherence
usually rely on the probabilistic interpretation of the Hilbert space norm.
He claims the norm can measure approximations even without probabilities, but
this assumption has not been properly justified. Without it, the combination of the
Everettian and decoherent histories formalisms leads to strange consequences, such as
a proliferation of small amplitude histories with lots of macroscopic quantum jumps.
Still, this erratic behavior may provide a way to justify the approximations, in a new
histories formalism, in which macroscopic causal relations play a central role. Small
histories, suffering too much interference, may lose causality, being thus discarded as
invalid. The remaining branches can present some small interference, opening the
possibility of experimental verification.
1 Introduction
Everettian Quantum Mechanics (EQM), or Many Worlds Interpretation [DG73, EI57],
is an attempt to solve the measurement problem of QuantumMechanics by rejecting the
measurement postulate. It applies the rest of the usual formalism to all systems (even
macroscopic ones), at all times (even during measurements). In EQM, a measurement
is just a quantum entanglement of the measured system with the measuring device
and the observer, which evolve into a macroscopic superposition of different versions
of themselves, each registering one of the results. The collapse of the wavefunction is
illusory, due to the fact that, as evolution is linear and interference is negligible, each
version of the observer is unaware of the other components of the superposition (which
are called branches or worlds).
EQM faces a preferred basis problem: how to decompose a macroscopic quantum
state into branches behaving approximately as the classical reality we observe. There
is also a probability problem: evolution via Schro¨dinger’s equation is deterministic, and
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all measurement results are obtained (even if in different branches), so why do quantum
experiments seem probabilistic, following the Born rule (which was eliminated with the
measurement postulate)?
An idea to solve this last problem, proposed by D.Deutsch [Deu99] and developed by
D.Wallace [Wal10, Wal12], uses decision theory to show that rational agents, following
EQM, should decide on bets about quantum experiments as if results were probabilistic
and followed the Born rule. Such high level approach requires branches where agents
exist as macroscopic quantum systems, so it depends on a solution to the first problem.
Wallace [Wal12] tries to solve it via decoherent histories, but approximations used in
decoherence, on the basis of negligible probabilities, are invalidated without the Born
rule. So these solutions form a circular argument [Bak07].
Wallace claims the Hilbert space norm is a dynamically natural feature of the
formalism, and this justifies the approximations. But, as we show, he has not made
this idea precise, nor provided a well developed defense of it. And, without a good
justification for the approximations, his mix of decoherent histories and EQM might
not deliver the expected results.
Still, if EQM is ever to work, it must incorporate decoherence somehow. So we
analyze what really results from Everettian Decoherent Histories (EDH): a combination
of these formalisms, prior to the Born rule, and without assuming from the start the
validity of the usual approximations. The consequences turn out to be quite strange.
For example, without a reason to neglect small amplitude histories, we must consider
the possibility that all histories do happen and are equally relevant, no matter how
bizarre. Tiny ones may exhibit frequent macroscopic quantum jumps, leading to a
breakdown of causality at the macroscopic level. On the other hand, all macroscopic
states exist at nearly all times, in one history or another, suggesting a complementary
perspective, in which nothing really changes at the macroscopic level.
These results suggest EDH might not work, but they may actually carry the seed
of a solution: tiny histories behaving so erratically as to lose causality should not be
considered valid histories, in the sense of narratives in which events are meaningfully
connected. So we propose the development of a causal histories formalism, exploring
relations between Born weights, interference and causality to get a more restrict defini-
tion of history. If successful, it might justify the approximations and solve the preferred
basis problem, possibly paving the way for a solution to the probability problem.
Our results might also help settle the testability problem: whether EQM can be
distinguished experimentally from the usual Quantum Mechanics. If the causal histo-
ries formalism works, causal branches should be free from the worst results of EDH,
but might exhibit tiny deviations from the usual predictions. This could, in principle,
provide a way to test EQM, if our experimental capabilities ever get precise enough.
If the formalism does not work, and those results turn out to be actual consequences
of EQM, this theory should be discarded for disagreeing with observations.
Section 2 reviews the measurement problem, EQM and its problems, and the his-
tories formalisms. In section 3 we criticize Wallace’s arguments for using decoherence
without probabilities, and in section 4 we analyze its combination with EQM without
the usual approximations. Section 5 questions the definition of history borrowed from
the decoherent histories formalism, and proposes a more restrict one, stressing the
importance of causal relations. Section 6 summarizes our conclusions.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Measurement Problem
In the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (CQM), the measurement
postulate states that, if a quantum system is in a state
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
ci |i〉 , (1)
with 〈i | j〉 = δij and
∑ |ci|2 = 1, and is measured with respect to the basis {|i〉}, the
result is one (and only one) of the i’s, and the state collapses to the corresponding |i〉.
Also, results are probabilistic, according to the following rule.
Born Rule. The probability of result i is pi = wi, where wi is its Born weight,
wi = |ci|2 = | 〈i | ψ〉 |2. (2)
This postulate agrees with experimental data, but is conceptually ambiguous. It
sets measurements apart from other quantum processes, which obey the deterministic
linear Schro¨dinger equation, but lacks a precise definition of what are measurements.
These might be distinguished for involving a classical macroscopic system, such as
an observer, but if this system’s particles obey Schro¨dinger’s equation, how can they
collectively produce a nonlinear probabilistic process? Probabilistic even in principle,
not simply due to lack of knowledge about the states of the particles. And how does the
collapse of the quantum state happen? Many attempts have been made to solve this
measurement problem, such as hidden variables theories, Bohmian mechanics, nonlinear
Schro¨dinger equations, and others, each with its own difficulties [Aul00, WZ14].
This relates to the problem of whether QuantumMechanics remains valid as systems
get bigger, with Classical Mechanics emerging from it. In the usual view, quantum
superpositions should not happen at the macroscopic level, lest we observe Schro¨din-
ger cats. But nothing in the quantum formalism seems to induce their disappearance in
large systems, quite to the contrary. So many physicists consider Quantum Mechanics
valid only for microscopic systems, with a new theory being needed to explain the
quantum-classical transition. This view becomes problematic as quantum phenomena
are verified at increasingly larger scales, or for research in fields like quantum cosmology.
Some see decoherence as an explanation for the emergence of classicality, but it is
questionable whether it eliminates superpositions, or merely wipes out interference
between their components, which remain nonetheless.
2.2 Everettian Quantum Mechanics
A solution, proposed by H. Everett III [DG73, EI57], rejects the measurement pos-
tulate, and applies the rest of the quantum formalism even to macroscopic systems.
Evolution is always deterministic, following Schro¨dinger’s equation, even during mea-
surements. It leads to macroscopic superpositions, but also explains why observers
do not perceive them. If not for some unsolved problems, it might explain quantum
measurements, and provide the link between quantum and classical mechanics.
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In EQM, measurements are just quantum entanglements of measuring devices with
whatever is being measured. More precisely, a measuring device for a basis {|i〉} of a
system is any apparatus, in a quantum state |D〉, which interacts in such a way that,
if the system is in state |i〉, the composite state evolves as1
|i〉 ⊗ |D〉 7−→ |i〉 ⊗ |Di〉 , (3)
where |Di〉 is a new state of the device, registering result i. Linearity of Schro¨dinger’s
equation implies that, if the system is in state (1), the composite state evolves as
|ψ〉 ⊗ |D〉 =
(∑
i
ci |i〉
)
⊗ |D〉 7−→
∑
i
ci |i〉 ⊗ |Di〉 .
This final state is to be accepted as an actual quantum superposition of macroscopic
states. But it will not be perceived as such by an observer looking at the device, as,
by the same argument, his state |O〉 will evolve into a superposition, according to(∑
i
ci |i〉 ⊗ |Di〉
)
⊗ |O〉 7−→
∑
i
ci |i〉 ⊗ |Di〉 ⊗ |Oi〉 , (4)
with |Oi〉 representing a state in which he saw result i. By linearity, each component
|i〉 ⊗ |Di〉 ⊗ |Oi〉 evolves independently, as if the others did not exist, as long as inter-
ference is negligible. This condition is usually justified, for macroscopic systems, using
decoherence arguments.
Everett’s interpretation of this final state is that the observer has split into different
versions of himself, each seeing a distinct result. Each version evolves as if the initial
state had been |i〉⊗ |D〉⊗ |O〉, so he does not feel the splitting, nor the existence of his
other versions. Each component is called a world or a branch, and this evolution of one
world into a superposition of many is called branching. So in EQM all possible results
of a measurement actually happen, but in different worlds. The observer in state |Oi〉
only thinks the system has collapsed into |i〉 because he does not see the whole picture,
with all other results and versions of himself.
Problems that plague the Copenhagen Interpretation disappear in EQM, but new
ones come along, as discussed below.
2.2.1 Probability Problem
In EQM, when measuring (1), any result i with ci 6= 0 is obtained with certainty, even
if not all versions of the observer see it. The probability problem is reconciling this with
experiments, which indicate results are probabilistic and follow the Born rule.
It has a qualitative aspect, of how probabilities can emerge from a deterministic
theory. In classical mechanics, processes can appear random due to our ignorance of
details, but in EQM one must explain the apparent randomness even if the quantum
state and its evolution are perfectly known.
1For simplicity, we assume the system remains in state |i〉, but this is not necessary.
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There is also the quantitative aspect of accounting for probability values. By a
Born-like rule we mean any result explaining why, in an Everettian universe (i.e. one
governed by EQM), quantum experiments would appear probabilistic, with probabil-
ities given by the Born weights (2). Many attempts have been made to obtain such
result [AL88, BHZ06, EI57, Gra73, Han03, Zur05].
Deutsch [Deu99] proposed an adaptation of Decision Theory [Kar14, PI09] to EQM,
to show that, in an Everettian universe, it would be rational to make decisions, related
to bets on the results of quantum experiments, as if the outcomes were probabilistic,
with Born weights playing the role of probabilities. The idea was further developed by
Wallace, which presented a formal proof [Wal10, Wal12]. But use of decision theory
requires worlds where narratives with agents, measurements and payoffs make sense.
This involves solving first the next problem.
2.2.2 Preferred Basis Problem
Decomposition of states like those in (4) may not be unique [Zur81], so it is not clear
whether there is one basis which gives the correct description in terms of worlds, or
how to find it. Also, Everett’s description of measurements assumes that EQM gives
rise, at least in some branches, to macroscopic structures, like devices and observers,
that behave classically, most of the time, up to a good approximation.
The preferred basis problem consists in finding a natural way to decompose the
quantum state of a macroscopic system into branches which behave like the classical
reality we observe (even if not all of them, and not all the time). Wallace [Wal12] has
proposed an adaptation of the decoherent histories formalism to solve this problem.
But, as we discuss in section 3, the probability problem may invalidate it.
2.2.3 Testability Problem
Solving those problems would put EQM in a better theoretical standing than CQM,
and might shed some light on the testability problem: whether experiments can tell
these theories apart.
Many physicists disregard EQM for predicting the same observable results as CQM,
and therefore not being testable. But if that is the case, any quantum experiment is a
test of EQM as much as of CQM. Impossibility of testing which one better describes
our universe does not make one worse than the other. Had EQM been developed first,
CQM might be the one being disregarded for making no new predictions (besides being
theoretically ambiguous).
Granted, one may feel uneasy with a theory predicting undetectable other worlds.
But any theory, even classical mechanics, has elements which can not be directly ob-
served, but are accepted due to other consequences being confirmed.
Anyway, there is no proof that EQM and CQM are experimentally equivalent.
Everett’s description of measurements assumes unitary quantum mechanics gives rise
to devices and observers, branches do not interfere, and the Born rule holds somehow.
Validity of these assumptions depends on solving the previous problems, and answers
we have so far indicate EQM might not precisely replicate CQM’s predictions.
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In a worst case scenario, Wallace’s proposed solution to the preferred basis problem
might actually lead to predictions at odds with observations, as shown in section 4,
indicating that EQM might simply be wrong. In the best case, perhaps such bad
predictions can be dismissed via a solution to the probability problem or the formalism
of section 5.2, and EQM can be tested through small deviations from the Born rule or
some new macroscopic quantum phenomena. There have been proposals of how to do
so [Deu86, Pag99, Pla97], but they are beyond our present experimental capability.
2.3 Histories Formalisms
Wallace’s approach [Wal12] to the preferred basis problem is based on the decoherent
histories formalism, which we review below.
2.3.1 Decoherence
Decoherence [JZK+03, Sch07, Zur02] is a process by which an open quantum system
loses some quantum characteristics, as it interacts and gets entangled with its environ-
ment.
Models show some states (called pointer states) are more robust with respect to
such interaction, i.e. have a stronger tendency to remain disentangled. We say such
states are selected by the environment, which measures them in the sense of (3). In
some cases they form an orthogonal basis, but in others they constitute an overcom-
plete set of vectors, as for example in the quantum brownian motion, where they are
minimum-uncertainty Gaussian packets (coherent states) |q, p〉. This example is con-
sidered a good paradigm for a macroscopic system, whose position and momentum
are continuously measured (with some imprecision) through the scattering of particles
from the environment. This would explain why macroscopic systems are observed in
states of fairly well defined position and momentum.
As the environment is differently affected by distinct pointer states, and such dif-
ferences spread across its many degrees of freedom, it rapidly evolves into (almost)
orthogonal states. Off-diagonal elements (coherences) of the reduced density matrix
of the system, with respect to the pointer states, decay extremely fast. This (almost)
eliminates interference between such states, and we say the system has decohered. Close
pointer states take longer to decohere, but this problem can be reduced by coarse grain-
ing, as we discuss in section 2.3.3. As systems get bigger, it is hard to shield them
from the environment, and decoherence becomes ever present.
As the reduced density matrix becomes (nearly) diagonal, it formally resembles a
classical probabilistic mixture. This is considered an important step in the quantum-
classical transition, but should not be interpreted as if the system had lost its quantum
nature and become classical. Tracing out the environment hid information about how it
is entangled to the system, but the composite system remains in a pure quantum state.
Adepts of CQM must explain the disappearance of all, but one, of the components of
the mixture.
In EQM, all components remain, but entangled to (almost) orthogonal states of
the environment. In this view, decoherence is just entanglement at work, a measure-
ment of pointer states by the environment, which selects a basis for decomposition
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into branches, and (almost) eliminates interference between them. What distinguishes
it is that it happens continuously, and, for all pratical purposes, is irreversible, as
information spreads through the environment’s many degrees of freedom.
The reduced density matrix of an open system follows a master equation, and its
dynamics lacks unitarity, which is central to Wallace’s proof of the Born rule. So in
describing the evolution of branches he turns to the consistent/decoherent histories
formalisms, which apply to closed quantum systems.
2.3.2 Consistent Histories
The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism, conceived by Griffiths [Gri84, Gri02] and
further developed by Omne`s [Omn88, Omn99], aims to describe quantum processes
in ways which allow the use of classical (Boolean) logic and classical probabilities. It
identifies conditions allowing us to assign classical probabilities to sets of alternative
histories, conceived as sequences of events or propositions about a system.
Its point of view is opposite to the Everettian one: quantum evolution is always
stochastic, and quantum states are only tools for calculating probabilities in a set of
possible evolutions, only one of which happens. Still, parts of the formalism adapt well
to the Everettian setting, if properly reinterpreted. We present a simplified version2,
assuming a normalized pure initial state ψ0 at time t0.
A quantum sample space is an orthogonal projective decomposition of Hilbert space,
i.e. a family {Pα} of orthogonal projection operators with
∑
α Pα = 1 and PαPβ =
δαβPα. It represents an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive events or propositions
about the system.
A history space is a sequence {Pα1(t1)}, . . . , {Pαn(tn)} of quantum sample spaces,
at times t0 < t1 < . . . < tn. Here Pα(t) = U(t, t0)
−1PαU(t, t0), as in the Heisenberg
picture, and U(t, t0) is the unitary time evolution operator of Schro¨dinger’s equation.
A history α = (α1, . . . , αk, . . . , αn) is a sequence of events, specifying one Pαk(tk)
from each sample space. In CH, only one history happens in each history space. And
even if α happens, we can not say that, at time tk, the system is in a state in the image
of Pαk(tk), for the ontology of CH is based on histories, not quantum states. States
are seen as artifacts of the formalism, and a different history space might yield another
“true” history, whose projector at tk could even be orthogonal to Pαk(tk).
To a history α we associate a branch state vector ψα = Pαn(tn) · · ·Pα1(t1)ψ0. In
CQM, with sample spaces representing projective measurements, this would be the final
state (up to normalization and time translation) if the sequence α of results happens,
which has probability pα = ||ψα||2. In EQM, it is one of the branches resulting from
the evolution of ψ0, and we are yet to make sense of probabilities. In CH, it has no
such interpretations, being only a tool to obtain the probability of history α happening,
which, under appropriate conditions (consistency, as described below), is postulated to
be, once more,
pα = ||ψα||2 = ||Pαn(tn) · · ·Pα1(t1)ψ0||2 . (5)
2Reflecting its stochastic point of view, CH is usually presented using density operators. Sometimes it
includes a final state, or allows quantum sample spaces to be branch dependent.
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A history space {P¯α¯k(tk)} is a coarse-graining or coarsening of {Pαk(tk)} if each
P¯α¯k(tk) is a sum of Pαk(tk)’s. Conversely, {Pαk(tk)} is a fine-graining or refinement
of P¯α¯k(tk). This concept is included in the formalism by bundling history spaces into
a history algebra, specified by taking, at each tk, a quantum event algebra, which is a
Boolean algebra3 of orthogonal projectors. The Boolean condition implies projectors
commute, so their ranges are mutually orthogonal if the intersection is {0}.
Given a coarsening {P¯α¯k(tk)} of {Pαk(tk)}, each coarser history α¯ can be seen as
a family of finer ones: we write α ∈ α¯ if, for each k, the range of P¯α¯k(tk) contains
that of Pαk(tk). Then ψα¯ =
∑
α∈α¯ ψα. The formalism requires the pα’s to behave as
classical probabilities, so they must be additive, pα¯ =
∑
α∈α¯ pα. Hence there must be
no interference between histories, and we require4 〈ψα|ψβ〉 = 0 for α 6= β. History
spaces satisfying this condition are called consistent5 (relative to ψ0), and are the only
ones allowed in CH.
A consistent history space is seen as a valid, or allowed, sequence of questions about
the system, at different times. In such space, only one sequence of answers, or history
α, turns out to be true, with probability pα. CH dismisses many quantum paradoxes
by noting they involve inconsistent history spaces, so the problem lies in us asking an
invalid set of questions. Of course, it is debatable whether it really solves the paradoxes,
or just forbids us asking inconvenient sets of questions.
Two consistent history spaces can be incompatible, in the sense that they can not
be combined into a single consistent one. Either one can be used to describe a quantum
process, but not both at once. This is the source of much criticism. If in each space
one history actually happens, are there many equally real but incompatible histories?
Is it possible to impose some condition that all “true” histories be compatible in some
sense, even if their history spaces are not? Can the formalism be supplemented with
new conditions singling out one consistent set?
A history space has a branching structure (relative to ψ0) if histories do not merge
after diverging, i.e. if α and β satisfy αi 6= βi and αj = βj , for some i < j, one of them
has zero probability. Consistency and branching are related as follows [Gri93, Wal12].
Branching-Consistency Theorem. 6 Any history space with a branching structure
is consistent, and the converse holds for some consistent refinement of it.
2.3.3 Decoherent Histories
Classicality is more than its probability laws, and CH admits histories that are far
from classical. The Decoherent Histories (DH) formalism, developed by Gell-Mann and
Hartle [GMH90, GMH93], combines CH and decoherence to get special history spaces
with a more classical behavior. It seeks not only (approximate) consistency7, but also
quasi-classicality, meaning histories approximately follow classical equations of motion,
interrupted at times (as in quantum measurements) by some quantum behavior.
3With operations P1 ∧ P2 = P1P2, P1 ∨ P2 = P1 + P2 − P1P2, and ¬P = 1− P .
4The condition Re〈ψα|ψβ〉 = 0 suffices for additivity, but is problematic for composite systems [Dio04].
5The terminology varies. Wallace uses consistency for additivity of probabilities, and decoherence for
non-interference (which relates, but is not equivalent, to the concept from section 2.3.1).
6Branching-Decoherence Theorem, in Wallace’s terminology.
7In their terminology, medium decoherence.
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In DH, the space of relevant variables of the subsystem of interest is partitioned into
cells Σα, large in comparison with the coherence lenght (below which decoherence is
not effective), yet small enough for the required precision. This determines a quantum
sample space given by operators Pα ⊗ 1env, where
Pα =
∫
Σα
dx|x〉〈x|, (6)
and 1env is the identity operator for the environment’s Hilbert space (with the environ-
ment taken to include the irrelevant variables of the subsystem). A history α specifies,
at a sequence of times tk, in which Σαk the subsystem is
8. Coarsenings and refinements
are obtained varying the cell size.
While in CH consistency is a precondition to admit a history space, in DH it arises
via decoherence. For large enough cells, states in the range of different Pα’s are distinct
enough to quickly get entangled to (almost) orthogonal states of the environment9.
Orthogonality tends to subsist as the environment evolves, for its many degrees of
freedom keep records of the history. For example, particles scattered by the system
in different directions, at distinct Σα’s, tend to remain in (almost) orthogonal states,
and affect other degrees of freedom in distinct ways. Erasing from the environment
all traces of the history is impossible in practice. Of course, as different states of the
environment evolve, they can spontaneously develop similar components, blurring their
records, but their Born weights would be negligibly small.
As records ensure (almost) consistency, (almost) additive probabilities can be as-
signed to histories, as in CH. Some interference between histories subsists, but it is
negligible if they are coarse enough. Deviations in the additivity of probabilities should
be irrelevant, as long as they are too small to be detected experimentally.
By the Branching-Consistency Theorem, some refinement of this (almost) consistent
history space will have an (approximate) branching structure. But such refinement will
not be in terms of projectors Pα˜⊗1env into smaller cells Σα˜, as it will require projecting
environmental states onto the different records.
Models show that, if histories are coarse enough, and the system has enough inertia
to resist noise from the environment, histories with non-negligible probabilities will
(approximately) follow classical equations of motion, with a stochastic force.
So a (almost) consistent history space seems to emerge naturally in DH, and its
non-negligible histories are quasi-classical. However, we can still have incompatible
descriptions of the evolution, as shown by Dowker and Kent [DK96].
3 Approximations and Discontinuities in Everettian
Quantum Mechanics
Wallace [Wal12] uses DH to solve the preferred basis problem. But as EQM is not
stochastic, and all histories happen, probabilities (5) can no longer be postulated. As
approximations used in decoherence rely on the negligibility of tiny probabilities, to
8If necessary, different families of cells can be used at each time.
9This fails near cell boundaries, but if cells are not too large, distinguishing adjacent ones is irrelevant.
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justify them one should first solve the probability problem. But Wallace’s solution
of this other problem depends on branches provided by the first solution, forming a
circular argument [Bak07].
He claims use of decoherence is valid even without probabilities, as its approxima-
tions could be justified in other ways. As we show in section 5, this may turn out to
be true, but the reason is not so immediate. To get there, we first need to dismiss
his arguments for accepting approximations from the start, so we can have the strange
results of section 4, which justify tightening the definition of history.
We are used to the idea that, whenever states ψ1 and ψ2 are very close in Hilbert
space, i.e. ||ψ1 − ψ2|| is very small, we can approximate ψ1 ∼= ψ2 in calculations or
experiments. But for this to be valid, whatever concrete physical meaning we attribute
to, or extract from, an abstract Hilbert space element must be continuous with respect
to that space’s metric. In other words, we need to know for certain whether states that
are close in the metric represent similar physical situations.
In CQM, a quantum state carries information about probabilities of measurements,
and the Born rule allows us to ignore small components, corresponding to unlikely
results. So the approximation ψ1 ∼= ψ2 is valid because replacing one state by the
other causes only small changes in probabilities.
In EQM, until the probability problem is solved, we can not simply assume that
tiny perturbations in a state can not alter much its physical meaning. If ψ1 and ψ2
are quantum states of a macroscopic system, their components in the branch decom-
position indicate which worlds are present. This ontology seems discontinuous: even if
||ψ1 − ψ2|| is small, one state can have components not present in the other, so their
physical interpretations can differ by whole worlds, invalidating ψ1 ∼= ψ2.
For example, let |ψǫ〉 =
√
1− ǫ |0〉 + √ǫ |1〉, where |0〉 and |1〉 represent distinct
branches. Without a Born-like rule or another justification, we can not neglect |1〉 nor
consider it any less relevant than the |0〉 component, no matter how small ǫ > 0 is.
So the physical meaning of |ψǫ〉 may change drastically when ǫ goes from 0 (a single
branch) to nonzero (two equally relevant branches).
We call this a branch discontinuity: arbitrarily small perturbations in a state can
create lots of completely different branches, none negligible (until further notice). One
might object that no reasonable physical theory can have discontinuities like these,
but the truth is we do not know EQM to be a good theory. Without a definitive
explanation of how it connects with experiments, we must admit the possibility that
it might lead to really bad predictions. Hence that objection is not valid.
In [Wal12, p.253], Wallace argues that, even without a probabilistic interpretation,
the Hilbert space norm can still be used as a measure of approximations or perturba-
tions. He does not provide a coherent defense of this, throwing just a few loose ideas
in a short Socratic dialogue. His argument seems to go vaguely like this: (unspecified)
dynamical features make the Hilbert space norm natural (whatever this means), and
this naturalness (somehow) justifies its use to measure approximations.
There is not much to do to contest such vague idea besides pointing out flaws in
the few statements presented in its defense. Note that we are not saying the Hilbert
space norm can not measure approximations, just that there is no reason to assume
from the start that it can. It is up to Wallace to provide a good reason for relying on
such assumption, and as we show he fails to do so. According to him [Wal12, p.253]:
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• “We can think of the significance of the Hilbert space metric as telling us when
some emergent structure really is robustly present, and when it’s just a ‘trick of
the light’ that goes away when we slightly perturb the microphysics”.
But this is precisely the problem: if tiny perturbations can create new branches,
branch decomposition is not a robust structure. Metrics do not make emergent
structures robust by fiat, it is up to the formalism to show robustness with respect
to the metric. If it can not, the idea that it gives rise to that structure may simply
be wrong.
• “. . . the Hilbert space norm is a perfectly objective feature of the physics, prior
to any considerations of probability”.
It is not clear what he means by objective, or why he considers the norm to be
so. In CQM, the norm is connected to probabilities, which can be considered
objective in the sense that they can be measured. In EQM, it is not clear if the
norm has observable consequences, so, instead of an objective feature, it might
be just a mathematical artifact of a possibly flawed formalism.
• “What makes perturbations that are small in Hilbert-space norm ‘slight’. . . ? Lots
of dynamical features of the theory. Small changes in the energy eigenvalues of
the Hamiltonian, in particular, lead to small changes in quantum state after some
period of evolution. Sufficiently small displacements of a wavepacket lead to small
changes in quantum state too.”
Instead of clearly stating which relation between norm and dynamics is relevant
for such ‘slightness’, Wallace just gives examples where small changes in a physical
situation cause small changes in the mathematical object representing it (quan-
tum state). But tiny physical changes can also cause large changes in Hilbert
space (e.g. a physically negligible displacement in a highly peaked wavepacket
may send it to a nearly orthogonal state). More importantly, these examples
do not imply that small changes in Hilbert space must represent small physical
changes. In fact, in EQM it seems tiny changes in quantum state might repre-
sent drastic physical changes (introduction of whole new worlds). If this seems
unreasonable, then, again, it might just mean EQM does not work.
• “Ultimately, the Hilbert-space norm is just a natural measure of state perturba-
tions in Hilbert space, and that naturalness follows from considerations of the
microphysical dynamics, independent of higher-level issues of probability.”
He does not say which considerations are these, nor what being ‘natural’ involves.
Perhaps he means the Hilbert space norm is natural in the sense of being preserved
by the dynamics, so small perturbations remain small as the system evolves. But
why would this be relevant for approximations? Classically, tiny changes in a
system can grow as it evolves, yet nonconservation of the metric does not prevent
its use to measure approximations. In CQM, norm conservation is important
for its probabilistic meaning, but states can grow increasingly dissimilar even as
they stay at constant distance in Hilbert space (e.g. non-overlapping wavepackets
moving apart). And in EQM it seems physically similar states might evolve into
drastically different ones (with different worlds), even if their distance in Hilbert
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space remains small.
• “. . . there’s nothing Everett-specific about the problem . . . I don’t think there’s
any profound difference here between the role of the Hilbert space metric in
quantum physics and, say, the spatial metric in classical physics.”
This may be a bad choice of example, as the spatial metric fails in both aspects
that seem to interest him: it is not dynamically conserved, and states which are
spatially close can be physically quite distinct (e.g. with different velocities).
Anyway, the situation in EQM is quite different from other theories. In CQM or
classical mechanics, for example, a clear connection between theory and experi-
ment tells us that close abstract states correspond to physically similar situations.
We understand what states represent, how to measure their properties, and that
these are continuous in the metric: close states give similar results. This is what
makes some metric a good measure of approximations, not some vague ‘natural-
ness’. In EQM, however, the usual link between quantum formalism and obser-
vation has been severed. Until one manages to confirm the experimental meaning
of a macroscopic state ψ in EQM, there is no guarantee that close states, in the
Hilbert space metric, would generate similar observations.
• “Instantiation is always approximate, and we measure that approximation us-
ing the natural distance measures of the instantiating theory. There’s need for
self-consistency – that distance measure had better appear natural from the per-
spective of the instantiated theory. But that self-consistency requirement doesn’t
make the whole enterprise viciously circular – it can’t, on pain of undermining
science in general, not just Everettian quantum theory.”
Again, he throws around the term ‘natural’ without saying what it means (that
the distance is part of the theory?), or how it relates to approximations. This
argument seems to repeat previous ones: the underlying theory has a distance
measure, so whatever emerges from it must be continuous in that distance. But,
again, we are not sure a branching structure emerges robustly from EQM, and,
unlike with science in general, we do not know how EQM relates to observations.
In [Wal12, p.129], Wallace mentions Everett’s original proof of the Born rule [EI57],
which was never accepted precisely because, without a probabilistic interpretation,
there was no reason to neglect a low Born weight set of deviant branches (in which
statistics deviate from the Born rule)10. And he suggests an argument to justify such
negligibility:
. . . the branching structure is [not] given exactly, by some particular choice
of basis. . . the structure is a consequence of decoherence, the branches are
only approximately orthogonal, and indeed the theory only approximately
specifies them. This suggests that in fact, at the emergent level appropri-
ate to a branching description there may be no deviant low-weight worlds.
If their weight is small compared to the level of noise in the decoherence
process, they will simply be an artefact caused by false precision, and will
10Graham’s proof [Gra73] faced the same difficulty.
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not have the robustness that. . . was an essential requirement for emergent
structure. As such (we might hope) all of the branches will exhibit approx-
imately correct statistics.
Let us examine in which sense the emergent branching structure is approximate.
A source of imprecision is the choice of cells: shifting their boundaries transfers Born
weight between branches, and smaller cells can split a branch into several. For small
enough cells, close ones are physically so similar that this imprecision is irrelevant. A
quite different approximation is the assumption that branch interference is negligible:
it involves discarding tiny components in the evolution of branches. Wallace seems to
mix the two, but the first imprecision does not justify this other approximation. For
example, as a branch evolves, its wavefunction can develop a tiny tail spreading across
distant cells. Changing the cells gives a different decomposition of the tail into tiny
branches, but does not eliminate it.
Wallace does not seem to consider his argument conclusive, as he then mentions
Hanson’s theory of mangled worlds [Han03, Han06] as an interesting approach along
those lines, but which needs more work11. Actually, he does not seem totally convinced
by any of his arguments, conceding that “. . . there’s plenty of work to be done here
by philosophers of science with an interest on emergence” [Wal12, p.254]. In fact, if
he could really justify the negligibility of tiny components then Everett’s proof would
be valid, and he would not need to develop a more tortuous one via decision theory.
Unfortunately, his proof has the same problem as Everett’s, and if that negligibility is
not accepted for one then it can not validate the other either.
Still, even if he thinks this point requires more work, he does not seem to consider
it a serious problem. After devoting only a few paragraphs to discuss it, throwing
some loose ideas without properly developing them, he proceeds as if the question had
been satisfactorily settled or had no significant impact on his proof of the Born rule.
Unfortunately, as we show in section 4, the consequences of not being able to justify
the usual approximations of decoherence can be quite severe.
4 Everettian Decoherent Histories
Without a good justification for its approximations in EQM, decoherence might not
give its usual results. But entanglement with the environment still happens anyway,
so it is important to analyze its consequences for EQM.
By Everettian Decoherent Histories (EDH) we mean the parts of the DH formalism
which do not depend on probabilities, reinterpreted from an Everettian perspective.
In it, branch discontinuities come into play, usual approximations are no longer valid,
and we must reanalyze all those “approximate” and “almost” permeating section 2.3.3.
As (5) can no longer be postulated to be a probability, we call ||ψα||2 the Born weight
of history α. All histories with nonzero Born weight happen, and must be considered
equally relevant (at least until there is some justifiable reason, like a Born-like rule, to
treat these weights as measures of relevance).
The range of (6) consists of wavefunctions with support in Σα. As evolution via
Schro¨dinger’s equation does not preserve compact supports, they instantly develop
11Our concept of causal histories (section 5.2) could also be included in this category.
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tails spreading across all cells. In CQM this is not seen as strange, for such tail gives
a negligible probability that the system will jump to a distant cell. In EQM, it means
new branches, corresponding to all other cells, pop into existence. Without a Born-like
rule, they must be considered as real and relevant as any.
As a result, a multitude of highly non-classical histories, which were negligible in
DH due to their tiny Born weights, become relevant. Essentially all histories do happen,
some ill behaved even by quantum standards, with lots of macroscopic quantum jumps.
Even from quasi-classical branches there is a continuous sprouting of tiny weird sub-
histories. The “penalty” for such bad behavior is a drastic reduction in Born weight,
but, without a Born-like rule, this may be irrelevant.
One might argue that macroscopic quantum jumps can not happen, as they violate
conservation laws. But these apply to averages over the whole state, not branchwise.
Of course, if EQM does allow large violations in branches, and no Born-like rule is
obtained to render them unlikely, then it should be discarded a failed theory.
This compromises the very idea of measurement. A device designed to work as in
(3) will always malfunction in some branches, spilling out all sorts of random results.
Again, this is not an acceptable description of our Universe, unless it is complemented
by a Born-like rule allowing us to neglect most possibilities. But, until such rule is
obtained, this is the picture we have to deal with in EDH.
It can be elucidating to compare this with Feynman’s formalism of path integrals.
One considers at first all possible paths, no matter how erratic. Destructive interference
clears the picture, allowing us to consider only the more well behaved ones. But the
more complicated ones are not really eliminated, they just have tiny Born weights.
Without a Born-like rule, they can no longer be neglected.
Decoherence does not really happen in terms of cells with precise boundaries, as
pointer states |πx〉 tend to be like gaussian packets, peaked at a point x, but with
small tails across all space. It does not make much difference in DH, as the tails give
negligible probabilities, but in EDH it might be better to redefine (6) as
Pα =
∫
Σα
dx|πx〉〈πx|. (7)
Evolution of the |πx〉’s can be more stable, but now the ranges of the Pα’s are only
almost orthogonal to each other: a state in the range of Pα can have a tiny component
in the range of another Pα′ . As it decoheres, besides α there will also be a tiny (but
equally relevant) component where the environment records α′.
Evolution of the environment also comprises all possibilities, including tiny com-
ponents where its macroscopic state changes drastically, and records disappear or get
replaced by wrong ones. As records are not reliable, tiny branches can suffer signifi-
cant interference from larger ones. For this, the difference in Born weights must be of
a great many orders of magnitude, even more so if the branches and their histories are
very different.
4.1 Quasi-classicality and Dissimilarity
In DH, non negligible histories behave quasi-classicaly. In EDH, no history is negligible,
most exhibit strange behaviors, but some will be quasi-classical. However, even these
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might be nothing like the world we know.
Our macroscopic reality is built with atoms and molecules, whose stability and
behavior depend on the Born rule, used in CQM to explain decay rates, chemical
reactions, etc. Quasi-classicality is no substitute for this. A branch can approximately
follow classical equations without even having stable atoms. For example, a branch
where all atoms have disintegrated, and all particles behave, at the macroscopic level,
like a classical gas, fits the definition of quasi-classical.
Disintegration of all atoms, or other phenomena usually disregarded as unlikely,
causes a huge reduction in Born weight, so large branches can not have previously
presented such problems. But, without a Born-like rule, preferring these would be akin
to cherry picking branches similar enough to our world to give the desired results.
In EDH, the only reason to assume the existence of branches similar to our world
is that everything will happen in at least some branches. But these will not be typical
in any sense, not even among quasi-classical ones.
This presents a big obstacle for decision theoretic proofs of a Born-like rule, which
depend on the existence of high level structures (agents, experiments, etc.), and on
their behavior being somewhat similar to what we are used to. Any such proof should
take into account the following condition:
Dissimilarity. Even quasi-classical branches can not be assumed to be similar to our
macroscopic reality. So no assumptions can be justified, and no possibilities excluded,
based on our physical experience.
For example, histories where a broken glass spontaneously becomes whole again
should happen in EDH, and some may even be quasi-classical, so Dissimilary may
encompass even the Second Law of Thermodynamics.
4.2 Almost Orthogonality
Orthogonality acquires its role in CQM via Measurement Postulate, which states that
measurements12 are in eigenvector bases of Hermitian operators, and uses orthogonal
projections to define Born weights. Orthogonal states are mutually exclusive, in the
sense that they can be eigenvectors for different values of an observable, and measuring
one eigenvector never results in the other values. In CH, orthogonality is present in
the projectors used to define histories, and in the requirement of consistency. In DH
it appears in the projectors (6), which are an idealization of the more realistic, almost
orthogonal, operators (7). Almost consistency is achieved by entanglement with almost
orthogonal states of the environment.
In EQM, one must ask whether branches, which are emergent structures, turn out
orthogonal to each other. EDH suggests we can have almost orthogonal measurements
or branchings, since emergence of branches is more natural in terms of the almost
orthogonal projectors (7), selected by decoherence with the environment. Perfect or-
thogonality can not be imposed just so EQM replicates conditions from CQM (like
measurements in orthogonal bases), nor as a necessity to obtain a Born-like rule (as
implicit in Wallace’s Boolean condition [Wal12, p.175]13).
12We refer only to projective measurements, as more general ones, like POVMs, can be reduced to them.
13See [Man18] for a discussion.
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In questioning orthogonality, we must also ask why observables correspond to Her-
mitian operators, or why histories are defined with orthogonal projectors. Unitary
evolution requires a Hermitian Hamiltonian, but it is not clear how this translates
into branchings along eigenbases of Hermitian operators. A measurement in EQM is
a normal quantum process, which happens to lead to different versions of measuring
device and observer, entangled to distinct states of the measured system, and evolv-
ing independently. Linearity of Schro¨dinger’s equation seems to allow this even for a
nonorthogonal basis.
For example, let |0〉 and |1〉 be orthonormal states, and |+〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2. It
is not immediate why, in EQM, no device D can measure in the basis {|+〉 , |1〉}, i.e.
interact in such a way that
|+〉 ⊗ |D〉 7−→ |+〉 ⊗ |D+〉 , and |1〉 ⊗ |D〉 7−→ |1〉 ⊗ |D1〉 . (8)
By Dissimilarity, one can not argue no known device does this, or that our knowl-
edge (based on CQM) forbids it. And, without a Born-like rule, one can not say the
probability for |+〉 would be greater than 1 in a measurement of |0〉 by D,
|0〉 ⊗ |D〉 =
(√
2 |+〉 − |1〉
)
⊗ |D〉 7−→
√
2 |+〉 ⊗ |D+〉 − |1〉 ⊗ |D1〉 .
A valid objection is that, if |D+〉 and |D1〉 are macroscopically distinct, differing in
the states of lots of particles, they must be almost orthogonal, so (8) violates unitarity.
But this would not apply if, instead of {|+〉 , |1〉}, D measured some almost orthogonal
basis {|a〉 , |b〉}, provided (3) is adjusted to allow for measurements perturbing the basis
states. We could very well have
|a〉 ⊗ |D〉 7−→ |a˜〉 ⊗ |Da〉 , and |b〉 ⊗ |D〉 7−→ |b˜〉 ⊗ |Db〉 ,
where |a˜〉 , |b˜〉 are perturbed states satisfying 〈a˜ | b˜〉 〈Da | Db〉 = 〈a | b〉.
This last condition requires |a〉 and |b〉 to be even closer to perfect orthogonality
than the macroscopicaly distinct states |Da〉 and |Db〉. Can such tiny deviations from
orthogonality be of any consequence? Once we have a Born-like rule, the answer might
be no, but until then, it is yes, for a couple of reasons:
1. Mutual exclusivity is lost. If there can be a measuring device D for an almost
orthogonal basis {|ǫ〉 , |1〉}, where |ǫ〉 = √1− ǫ |0〉+√ǫ |1〉 for small ǫ > 0, then a
measurement of |0〉 by D will result |1〉 in some branches.
2. Any set of mutually orthogonal states is linearly independent, but this fails with
almost orthogonality, if the number of states is large. A linear combination of a
huge number of almost orthogonal, macroscopically distinct, states, might even
result in a state macroscopically quite different from all of them14. So a quantum
state might admit two decompositions in terms of quite different sets of worlds.
Another way to look at this is that the set of branches which can emerge from
EQM includes incompatible decoherent history spaces.
14One can build a large number of wavepackets peaked in a group of cells, whose sum peaks far away.
The example is artificial, but shows the need to explain why it could not happen in realistic cases.
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5 Histories and Macroscopic Causality
The problems of EDH may stem from the definition of history, which works well for
DH, but becomes too broad when we no longer have probabilities to prune the worst
branches. A solution might be to tighten it by requiring a sense of causality between
events of a history. This may be quantified in terms of how little interference it suffers,
with its Born weight providing an indication of its resistance to interference. An
adequate formalism based on this idea is still in the works, so here we just lay out the
main notions and possible ways to develop them.
5.1 All Histories or No History?
Even if its Born weight concentrates in some cells, a quantum state usually has compo-
nents in all cells at nearly all times, as only exceptionally the wavefunction vanishes in
a whole cell. In DH, probabilities allow us to neglected most cells and focus on those
of sizable Born weight. In a visual analogy, imagine cells in shades of gray, those of
larger Born weight being darker. As dark spots move and divide into lighter ones, we
get a picture of branching histories, each as probable as its final darkness level, with
only quasi-classical ones being discernible.
In EDH, unless Born weights acquire some meaning, all nuance disappears, and cells
are either black (nonzero component) or white (absolutely no component). Barring
exceptional cases, they are black all the time. In this case, is it reasonable to say all
histories happen, or there is no history? Sticking to a visual analogy, is a black paper
full of black paths, or has it no paths?
Formally, we can define histories or paths as we wish. If paths are defined as
arbitrary sequences of black dots, a black paper is full of paths. But we usually hope
such labels reflect our intuitive ideas, which matter for interpreting results. For paths,
we might want a color different from the paper, and maybe some notion of continuity
to connect the dots. In transposing the definition of histories from DH to EDH, we
must question whether it retains its intuitive interpretation.
In the usual definition of a history α, consecutive projectors Pαi(ti) and Pαi+1(ti+1)
are linked by U(ti+1, ti), and a component in Σαi+1 only counts if it came from Σαi .
In EDH, we must consider that usually a state in Σα, at ti, generates components in
all Σα′ ’s at ti+1, and, conversely, each Σα′ will have components coming from all Σα’s.
Even if U(ti+1, ti) shows αi contributes a component to αi+1, we can not say event
αi+1 happens at ti+1 because of αi at ti. Other cells would cause αi+1 anyway, and the
component coming from αi may even interfere destructively, reducing the Born weight
of αi+1 (not that it matters, at this point).
So macroscopic causal relations get lost, if everything happens, all the time, in
some branch, and interference prevents tracking, in a meaningful way, the causes and
consequences of anything. Consider for example the following events:
A. There is no glass anywhere;
B. All glasses are safely stored inside the kitchen cabinet;
C. There is a glass at the edge of the kitchen table;
D. There is glass shattered on the floor beside the kitchen table.
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Presented with D, one might think it most likely follows from C. But in EDH it may
just as well result from B, with the glass breaking after tunneling from the cabinet, or
even A, with atoms spontaneously joining to form pieces of glass on the floor. In fact,
two opposite points of view seem valid in EDH:
• All histories: there is glass on the floor for all these reasons at once, as any
macroscopic state is generated by all others.
• No history: there is glass on the floor because, at all times, there is always glass
on the floor in some branches.
The first one follows the definition of histories from DH. That it seems unreason-
able is an indication that such definition may be too broad for EDH. The second one
abandons that definition, and adopts the intuitive idea that histories should involve
change, with events ceasing to happen and new ones coming about.
5.2 Causal Histories
With a more adequate concept of history it may be possible to avoid such extremes,
and also obtain a non-probabilistic interpretation for Born weights.
Suppose, at time t1, a state has its Born weight equally divided among the events
A, B and C above, and, a little later, at t2, the weight on D is not too small. As
discussed, we can not say D happens at t2 because of any specific event at t1. But we
can attribute its weight mostly to C, since A and B generate tiny components on D,
which interfere negligibly with the larger one coming from C.
Imagine, on the other hand, that at t1 most weight is on A or B, while C has a tiny
component whose contribution to D is as small as that of A or B. Now interference
keeps us from identifying any of these events as the source of the weight on D.
So Born weights play a non-probabilistic role, measuring resistance to interference,
and allowing the establishment of causal relations for larger branches, less affected by
interference. This brings shades of gray back to our visual analogy: wavepackets of
large Born weight, suffering little interference, move along darker quasi-classical paths,
amidst an ocean of almost white cells, whose lightness flickers, in indiscernible ways, as
they suffer interference from everywhere. Such cells remain in a state of perpetual but
timeless existence: they are present at (nearly) all times, but their Born weights, and
their microstates, fluctuate meaninglessly, with no causal relations connecting them to
other cells in a significant macroscopic narrative. A cell will only be part of an evolving
narrative once a discernible wavepacket passes through it, linking it causally in time
with other cells.
This idea suggests a new formalism of causal histories, including only those with
Born weight large enough to resist interference and sustain macroscopic causal rela-
tions. Histories of low Born weight are discarded not on probability grounds, but for
lack of causality: sequences of unrelated events are not histories in any meaningful
sense of the word, only artifacts of a definition that was too broad.
The Born weight below which histories are to be discarded can not be absolute. As
they keep on branching, eventually even the largest one will fall below any fixed thresh-
old. As its weight becomes much smaller than the total weight of the rest, one might
think that interference inevitably becomes a problem. But interference decays rapidly
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with the distance, so cells that are far apart should not interfere significantly, unless
their weight difference is of a great many orders of magnitude. So a tiny wavepacket
can evolve causally as long as there are no large ones nearby. Also, note that distances
increase rapidly in high dimensional spaces: if, for example, 1030 particles are displaced
by 10−10m each, the total system moves 100 km in configuration space.
We want to say a history α = (α1, . . . , αn) is causal if any interference it suffers
is so small that nearly all Born weight in cell Σαn , at time tn, comes via α. Making
this precise requires an appropriate measure of interference I(α), for which a history
α will be causal if I(α) ≪ 1. Note that a history can suffer significant interference at
some steps, which latter dissipates, and a stronger causality condition might require
negligible interference at each step.
We present some possible interference measures, which compare the effect of all
other histories on Σαn with that of α:
I1(α) =
∑
α˜6=α,
α˜n=αn
||ψα˜||
||ψα|| , I3(α) =
∑
α˜ 6=α,
α˜n=αn
|〈ψα˜ | ψα〉|
||ψα||2
,
I2(α) =
||Pαn(tn)ψ0 − ψα||
||ψα|| , I4(α) =
| 〈Pαn(tn)ψ0 − ψα | ψα〉 |
||ψα||2
.
Clearly, I3 ≤ I1 and I4 ≤ I2. Also, I2 ≤ I1 and I4 ≤ I3, as Pαn(tn)ψ0 =
∑
α˜n=αn
ψα˜.
So I1 imposes the strongest condition, while I4 gives the weakest one. Still, if a history
is I3-causal (resp. I4-causal), a refinement will be I1-causal (resp. I2-causal).
I1 and I2 take into account all components generated on Σαn , while I3 and I4 ignore
those orthogonal to ψα. This last approach may be preferable, since if α˜n = αn but
ψα and ψα˜ are orthogonal they do not really interfere. For example, they might have
different records in the environment, which (assuming they are correct) allow us to
distinguish in ψα + ψα˜ which part is caused by which history, and even refine them to
become causal in the sense of I1 and I2.
I1 and I3 neglect interference between other histories, allowing lots of tiny ψα˜’s,
which might cancel out, to be counted as if they had a large cumulative effect on Σαn .
I2 and I4 take such interference into account, but this can also cause difficulties. Let
α˜ and αˆ be histories, distinct from α, with ψα˜ = ψα and ψαˆ = −ψα. Should we say
ψα˜ and ψαˆ cancel out and the branch in Σαn is caused by α, or do ψα and ψαˆ cancel
out and α˜ causes Σαn? Are both α and α˜ causal, or neither one?
With I1, causal histories form an approximate branching structure, and with I3
this holds for some refinement (possibly involving environmental variables). The same
might be false with I2 or I4, as in the situation above.
Environmental records make 〈 ψα˜||ψα˜|| |
ψα
||ψα||
〉 tend to 0 quite fast, as α˜ and α become
more different. So, with I3 or I4, for α not to be causal there must be an α˜, with
α˜n = αn, for which ||ψα˜|| ≫ ||ψα|| by a great many orders of magnitude, all the more
so if the histories are very different. So a history should be I3- or I4-causal whenever its
Born weight is not too small, or if there are no close histories of much larger weight (nor
more distinct ones with an extremely larger weight). Taking refinements if necessary,
the same holds for I1 or I2.
An appropriate threshold for the inequality I(α) ≪ 1, above which histories are
to be discarded as non causal, is also necessary. It should not be too arbitrary, and
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its precise value should not affect results significantly. This may be hard to come by,
so we might have to consider instead a gradation of causality (which would bring the
question of what does it mean for a history to be more or less causal).
If an adequate causality condition can be established, and the formalism works as
expected, it will give Born weights an initial non-probabilistic role in EQM. This can
be a step towards proving a Born-like rule, which, once obtained, might justify the
choice of threshold, as one which allows probabilities of causal histories to fluctuate,
due to interference, only within a desired precision.
As causal histories can suffer tiny amounts of interference, this formalism opens the
possibility of experimental verification for EQM. However, it should require a precision
beyond our present capabilities.
Hanson [Han03] has also proposed using interference to justify discarding small
branches, but through a different process: interference would cause small worlds to be
“mangled”, with observers ceasing to exist or remembering events from larger worlds.
This seems like a quite dramatic interpretation of the concept of interference, and he
provides no explanation of how such mangling process would happen.
6 Conclusion
Wallace’s use of decoherent histories to solve the preferred basis problem is promising,
but incomplete. Unless the probability problem is solved first, the Born rule can not
justify the usual approximations in decoherence, and his attempt to justify them on
non-probabilistic grounds is not satisfactory. Without a good reason to assume the
validity of the approximations, one must admit that mixing EQM and decoherent
histories might have weird consequences:
• Branch decomposition is not a robust feature of the formalism, due to branch
discontinuities: arbitrarily small changes in a quantum state can create lots of
completely different new branches.
• Nearly all macroscopic histories happen, and those of small Born weight are (until
further notice) as relevant as large ones.
• All macroscopic states are present at nearly all times. So there is no real history,
in the sense of a narrative with events coming into existence and ceasing to occur.
• Histories with tiny Born weights can exhibit frequent macroscopic quantum jumps,
destroying any macroscopic sense of causality. Even those allowing a meaningful
macroscopic narrative keep sprouting lots of ill behaved subhistories.
• Quasi-classicality is not enough for similarity to our world. Tiny quasi-classical
branches might not even have stable atoms.
• Environmental records are unreliable, and tiny branches can suffer significant
interference from much larger ones.
• Measurements or branch decompositions in almost orthogonal bases are possible,
and orthogonal states might not be mutually exclusive upon measurement.
• Even allowing for coarsenings or refinements, branch decompositions might be
non unique, and two decompositions can involve quite different sets of branches.
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Of course, if EQM really leads to such results, it must be discarded as a bad model
for physical reality. But there may be ways to avoid this:
1. Proving a Born-like rule would allow us to neglect small branches, which are the
ill behaved ones, as unlikely. But if the proof depends on well behaved branches
obtained through decoherence, the problems above must be considered, to avoid
circularity. This may rule out decision theoretic proofs, and the consequences for
Wallace’s proof are analyzed in [Man18].
2. Developing a causal histories formalism, in which small branches that suffer so
much interference and behave so erratically as to lose causality at the macroscopic
level are not considered valid histories.
Such formalism is under development, and many questions need answer to ensure
it would work. We must determine the most appropriate way to measure interference,
and how much of it is too much for causality. Possibly there is not a unique answer,
and distinct approaches might be better suited for different situations.
If it works as expected, Born weights would acquire their first role in EQM, as
measures of causality or resistance to interference. Also, causal histories turn out to
be not only quasi-classical, but also to have all ingredients needed to form our classical
reality: stable atoms, working molecules, etc. Basically, all phenomena deemed likely
in CQM due to large Born weights should be present, while all the weirdness associated
with small weights should be mostly absent.
This solution of the preferred basis problem, and the fact that Born weights would
finally have some significance in EQM, might provide an appropriate framework for
proving a Born-like rule, via decision theory or some other approach. And, as causal
histories are not completely free of interference, this opens, at least in principle, the
possibility of testing EQM.
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